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Abstract
After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality
properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the
availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with
rm heterogeneity. Within this framework we show that non-separable
utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous rm heterogeneity cause
the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of
products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the
monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the
existing literature, we also show that the extent of the errors depends
on the degree of rm heterogeneity. In particular, the ine¢ ciency of the
market equilibrium is largest when selection among heterogenous rms
is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many rms with low
productivity and relatively few rms with high productivity.
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1 Introduction
Do monopolistically competitive industries yield an optimal level of product
diversity? As discussed by Neary (2004), this classic issue in industrial or-
ganization motivated the canonical formalization of the Chamberlinian model
(Chamberlin, 1933) as put forth by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
These scholars propose reduced formmodels that "regard aggregate demands
as if they result from the maximisation of a utility function dened directly
over the quantities of goods, and the form of the utility function is intended to
capture the desire for variety" (Dixit, 2004, p.125).1 The classic issue can be
itself split into four questions concerning the optimality of the market outcome
(Stiglitz, 1975): Are there too few or too many products? Are the quantities of
the products too small or too large? Are the products supplied by the right set
of rms, or are there errorsin the choice of technique? Are monopolistically
competitive industries too large or too small with respect to the rest of the
economy?
The Chamberlinian model makes four basic assumptions (Bishop, 1967;
Brakman and Heijdra, 2004): the number of sellers in a group of rms is suf-
ciently large so that each rm takes the behavior of other rms in the group
as given; the group is well dened and small relative to the economy; products
are physically similar but economically di¤erentiated so that buyers have pref-
erences for all types of products (love for variety); there is free entry. In this
setup, optimality rests on how the market mechanism deals with the crucial
tradeo¤ of e¢ ciency versus diversity(Kaldor, 1934).
As forcefully highlighted by Dixit and Stiglitz (1975), there are good reasons
to doubt that the market will generally strike the right balance due to the public
nature of diversity in the reduced form approach. As in these models the range
of products enters utility as a direct argument in addition to the quantities
consumed, the range itself becomes a public good whose social benet is not
fully reected in private incentives. In the words of Spence (1976, pp. 230-231):
"[T]here are conicting forces at work with respect to the number
or variety of products. Because of setup costs, revenues may fail to
cover the costs of a socially desirable product. As a result, some
products may be produced at a loss at an optimum. This is a force
tending towards too few products. On the other hand, there are
forces tending towards too many products. First, because rms hold
back output and keep price above marginal cost, they leave more
room for entry than would marginal cost pricing. Second, when
a rm enters with a new product, it adds its own consumer and
producer surplus to the total surplus, but it also cuts into the prots
of the existing rms. If the cross elasticities of demand are high, the
dominant e¤ect may be the second one. In this case entry does not
increase the size of the pie much; it just divides it into more pieces.
Thus, in the presence of high cross elasticities of demand, there is a
tendency toward too many products".
1Structuralmodels, instead, "give an explicit model of a consumers choice where diver-
sity plays a role; discrete choice from a collection of products di¤erentiated by location in a
characteristic space in the most common framework" (Dixit, 2004, p.125). See Anderson, de
Palma and Thisse (1992) for microfoundations of the representative-consumer reduced form
approach based on random-utility models of discrete choice.
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As the issue of optimal product diversity does not admit a general settlement,
explicit models with a detailed formulation of demand are used to isolate and
analyze the four questions described above. The canonical choice is to model an
economy consisting of two sectors. The rst sector is monopolistically competi-
tive and is the focus of the analysis. The second sector is perfectly competitive
and represents the rest of the economy. Its purpose is to hold factor prices in
check and to create the slack needed to answer the question whether the mo-
nopolistically competitive sector is too small or too big. This way the market is
allowed to eventually misallocate resources not only within the monopolistically
competitive sector but also between this sector and the rest of the economy.
The best known insights of the canonical model concern the special case in
which the group utilitydened over di¤erentiated products is separable across
them, the demand of each product is CES and rms are homogeneous. In this
case, the model shows that the rst-best (unconstrained) optimum calls for
more product variety than the market provides. From a normative perspective,
however, this result is traditionally regarded of little practical relevance for
policy intervention because implementing the unconstrained optimum requires
the use of lump-sum instruments that are hardly available in reality. These
are needed to subsidize the entry of rms that otherwise would not cover their
setup (entry) costs due to marginal cost pricing at the optimum. A lot of
attention has, therefore, been devoted to the constrainedoptimum in which
the monopolistically competitive sector is nancially self-su¢ cient. Under this
constraint, the market is shown to provide the optimal number of products, the
optimal size of rms and hence the optimal size of the sector.
The robustness of these results has been investigated along several dimen-
sions, with particular attention devoted to the impact of variable demand elas-
ticity and rm heterogeneity. These extensions are already discussed by Stiglitz
(1975), Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), who show that, when the
elasticity of demand is allowed to vary, the market equilibrium ceases to be
constrained optimal. In particular, products are too many (too few) and are
supplied in too small (too large) quantities when the elasticity of product utility
is increasing (decreasing) in the quantity consumed. As for rm heterogeneity,
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consider a variant of their model in which there are two
groups of di¤erentiated products that are perfect substitutes for each other with
each group having CES sub-utility. Both xed and marginal costs are allowed to
di¤er between the two groups but not within them. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) use
this variant to show that the determination of the set of products to be supplied
depends on a richer list of factors: xed and marginal costs, the elasticity of the
demand schedule, the level of the demand schedule and the cross-elasticities of
demand. As a result, constrained optimality eventually applies only to a zero-
measure set of parametrizations. A more exhaustive treatment of this issue can
be found in Spence (1976), while Stiglitz (1975) reaches similar conclusions in
a model of the capital market in which rms with heterogeneous costs issue
securities whose returns are imperfectly correlated with each other.
Some decades of relative oblivion followed, with relatively rare contribu-
tions in the theory of monopolistic competition. An exception is Pascoa (1997),
which rst discussed classes of models with heterogeneous goods and rms to
show the relative role of demand elasticity and increasing returns to scale in
generating monopolistically competitive equilibria. But a di¤use interest in the
optimality properties of monopolistic competition has re-emerged only recently
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due to the heterogeneous rms revolutionin international trade theory (Melitz
and Redding, 2012). This has been initiated by Melitz (2003), who shows that
a Dixit-Stiglitz model with CES demand, endogenous rm heterogeneity and
xed export costs (but without the homogeneous good sector) predicts new
gains from trade liberalization through the selection of the most e¢ cient rms.2
Subsequent papers show that a similar result holds when demand exhibits vari-
able elasticity, though xed export costs are not necessarily needed for the result
to materialize in this case (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Behrens and Murata,
2012). Bertoletti, Etro and Simonovska (2017) show that with rm heterogene-
ity, indirect additivity generates lower gains from trade than under CES, with
the di¤erence linked to the average pass-through.
The validity of these (among other) insights on international trade issues
when alternative specications of demands are allowed for is discussed by Zh-
elobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012). Using a framework with variable
elasticity of substitution (VES), they show that CES is just a knife-edge case.
While this nding is reminiscent of the conclusions by Stiglitz (1975), Spence
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse
(2012) do not discuss its implications for optimum product variety as those early
contributors do. This is done, instead, by Dhingra and Morrow (2016) who fully
characterize the optimality properties of a general demand system derived from
separable group utility. Their normative analysis thus complements the posi-
tive analysis of Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012), showing that,
in the absence of the homogeneous sector, the market outcome achieves the (un-
constrained) optimum under CES but not under VES. When a homogeneous
sector is instead introduced, Melitz and Redding (2012) show that CES leads
to constrained rather than unconstrained optimality due to the misallocation of
resources between sectors. In other words, with CES rm heterogeneity does
not change the welfare insights of the original Dixit-Stiglitz framework while
things change in the case of VES.
The present paper goes back to the full set of classic questions laid down
at the beginning of this introduction, with renewed emphasis on the question
whether in the market equilibrium the products are supplied by the right set of
rms. As Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014), the paper does so in a Melitzian
framework of endogenous rm heterogeneity with variable demand elasticity à
la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). However, it di¤ers from Nocco, Ottaviano and
Salto (2014) in terms of focus. The main of purpose of Nocco, Ottaviano and
Salto (2014) is to highlight that, with variable demand elasticity and endogenous
rm heterogeneity, the market outcome errs in several ways, with respect to the
number of products, the size and the choice of producers, and the overall size of
the monopolistically competitive sector. Di¤erently and crucially with respect
to the existing literature, the main purpose of the present paper is to also show
that the extent of those errors depends on the degree of rm heterogeneity.
Apart from Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014), none of the papers previ-
ously cited simultaneously addresses the four classic questions on the optimality
of monopolistic competition in a framework with variable demand elasticity and
endogenous rm heterogeneity. Moreover, none of them, including Nocco, Ot-
taviano and Salto (2014), provides a systematic quantitative analysis of the
2See Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) as well as Melitz and Redding (2012)
for a discussion of the actual novelty of these ndings.
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impact of di¤erent degrees of rm heterogeneity on the extent of market inef-
ciencies. The discussion in Spence (1976) is systematic but qualitative, while
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) conne themselves to the special scenario discussed
above. Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) characterize the social planner outcome
with homogeneous rms within the same framework with variable demand elas-
ticity adopted here. Bertoletti and Etro (2016) provide the rst characterization
of the social planner problem for any symmetric preferences comparing it with
the corresponding market equilibrium in the case of homogeneous rms. Neither
contribution considers rm heterogeneity. Dhingra and Morrow (2016) are closer
to what the present paper tries to achieve but the focus of their comparative sta-
tics is on the parametrization of demand rather than on the parametrization of
rm heterogeneity. In addition, not having the homogeneous good sector pre-
vents them from discussing between-sector misallocation. Di¤erently, Stiglitz
(1975) presents comparative statics results on the heterogeneity parameters but
his heterogeneity is not endogenous and his approach, based on a utility dened
over alternative portfolios of assets, is quite distinct from the canonical model
of monopolistic competition.
Clearly, as pointed out by Stiglitz (1975) and others, without some appro-
priate parametrization of the problem, it would be hard to cut any new ground
on the issues of interest. As Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014), the present
paper relies on the specic parametrization of linear demand introduced by
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) as applied to endogenous rm hetero-
geneity by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). This parametrization is less general
than the VES systems studied by Dhingra and Morrow (2016) and Zhelobodko,
Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012) in terms of product utility but allows for
cross-product e¤ects that are absent in the former paper and only touched upon
in the latter. Moreover, di¤erently from Dhingra and Morrow (2016) and Zh-
elobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012), we follow Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) also in parametrizing heterogeneity in terms of a Pareto distribution of
rm productivity. Within this framework we are able to revisit all the afore-
mentioned four questions on the optimality of the market outcome emphasizing
how the extent of rm heterogeneity a¤ects the answers. We do so in the wake
of Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani (2003) and Ottaviano (2012) asso-
ciating the scale and shape parameters of the Pareto productivity distribution
with the dimensions of cost-increasing richnessand cost-decreasing evenness
of rm heterogeneity.
Our exposition is organized around the comparison of results obtained with
and without rm heterogeneity in the equilibrium and in the rst best (un-
constrained) optimum as this allows us to encompass the ndings of Ottaviano
and Thisse (1999) in a similar setup with homogeneous rms. First, we show
that the total output of the monopolistically competitive sector in the mar-
ket equilibrium is smaller than optimal with and without rm heterogeneity.
With heterogeneous rms, more cost-decreasing evenness decreases (increases)
the gap in the total output of the di¤erentiated varieties between the market
equilibrium and the optimum when evenness is initially limited (pronounced).
More cost-increasing richness always increases the gap.
Second, we nd that, while with homogeneous rms the output of each rm
in the market equilibrium is ine¢ ciently small, with rm heterogeneity this holds
true only for the average output per rm: the equilibrium quantities produced
by less productive rms are ine¢ ciently large whereas those supplied by more
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productive rms are ine¢ cienty small. More cost-decreasing evenness makes
the overprovision of varieties relatively more likely than its underprovision in
the market equilibrium. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this.
Third, we show that the market provides an ine¢ cient number of varieties,
both when rms are homogeneous and when they are heterogeneous. In both
cases the number of varieties supplied in the market equilibrium can either be
richer or poorer than optimal depending on the parameters of the model. In
particular, product variety will be ine¢ ciently rich for large market size, high
substitutability between varieties, low entry costs and low unit costs of produc-
tion. Less cost-decreasing evenness and more cost-increasing richness makes the
under-provision of variety relatively more likely than its over-provision in the
market equilibrium.
Fourth and last, obviously the issue of selection among rms producing with
di¤erent techniques can only be analyzed when rms are heterogeneous, as with
homogeneity all rms (or none) produce in equilibrium. We nd that products
present in the market are not supplied by the right set of rms as selection in
the market equilibrium is weaker than optimal and there are varieties supplied
by low productivity rms that would not be supplied in the optimum. More
cost-decreasing evenness increases the gap in selection between the market equi-
librium and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact on this gap.
Through all these channels, the degree of heterogeneity has a multifaceted
impact on the degree of ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium. Analyzing overall
welfare, the key insight is that the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium is
largest when selection is needed most, that is, when there are a lot of low
productivity rms and few high productivity ones. We show that this conclusion
holds also when policy makers lack the tools needed to implement the rst best
(unconstrained) optimum and have to settle for the second best (constrained)
optimum in which they cannot a¤ect rmspricing and selection but can only
target product variety as in the traditional literature with homogeneous rms.
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 briey presents
the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Sections 3 and 4, respectively, de-
rive and compare the market equilibrium and the rst best (unconstrained)
optimum, focusing rst on the case in which rms are homogeneous as in Ot-
taviano and Thisse (1999), and then on the case of heterogeneous rms as in
Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014). Section 5 investigates how the extent of rm
heterogeneity a¤ects the gap between the equilibrium and rst best optimum
outcomes. Section 6 discusses the second best (constrained) optimum where
policy makers may not use lump sum trasfers for rms. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014),
consider an economy populated by L consumers, each endowed with one unit
of labor. Preferences are dened over a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties
indexed i 2 
, and a homogeneous good indexed 0. All consumers own the
same initial endowment q0 of this good and share the same utility function
6
given by
U = qc0 + 
Z
i2

qci di 
1
2

Z
i2

(qci )
2
di  1
2

Z
i2

qci di
2
(1)
with positive demand parameters ,  and , the latter measuring love for
varietyand the others measuring the preference for the di¤erentiated varieties
with respect to the homogeneous good.3 The initial endowment q0 of the homo-
geneous good is assumed to be large enough for its consumption to be strictly
positive at the equilibrium and optimal outcomes.
Labor is the only input. It can be employed for the production of the ho-
mogeneous good under constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement
equal to one. It can also be employed for the production of the di¤erentiated
varieties. In this case the technology requires a preliminary R&D e¤ort of f > 0
units of labor to design a new variety and its production process, which is also
characterized by constant returns to scale. The R&D e¤ort leads to the design
of the new variety with certainty whereas the unit labor requirement c of the
corresponding production process is uncertain, being randomly drawn from a
continuous distribution with cumulative density G(c) over support [0; cM ] The
R&D e¤ort cannot be recovered and is therefore a sunk labor requirement.
3 Equilibrium and Unconstrained Optimum
3.1 Market Outcome
In the market equilibrium consumers maximize utility under their budget con-
straints, rms maximize prots given their technological constraints, and mar-
kets clear. It is assumed that the labor market as well as the market of the
homogeneous good are perfectly competitive. This good is chosen as numeraire,
which under perfect competition implies that the wage equals one given its unit
labor requirement. The market of di¤erentiated varieties is, instead, monopo-
listically competitive with a one-to-one relation between rms and varieties.
The rst order conditions for utility maximization under the budget con-
straint gives individual inverse demand for variety i as
pi =   qci   Qc (2)
for qci > 0, where Q
c =
R
i2
 q
c
i di is total individual quantity consumed of the
di¤erentiated good. Aggregate demand for variety i can be derived from (2) as
qi  Lqci =
L
N + 
  L

pi +
N
N + 
L

p; 8i 2 
 (3)
where the set 
 is the largest subset of 
 such that demand is positive, N
is the measure (number) of varieties in 
 and p = (1=N)
R
i2
 pidi is their
3The demand system exhibits love of varietybecause, holding the distribution of prices
constant (namely holding the mean p and variance 2p of prices constant), utility rises with
product variety N . Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that rewriting the indirect utility
function in terms of average price and price variance reveals that it decreases with average
prices p, but rises with the variance of prices 2p (holding p constant), as consumers then
re-optimize their purchases by shifting expenditures towards lower priced varieties as well as
the numeraire good.
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average price. Variety i belongs to this set if its price satises
pi  1
N + 
(+ N p)  pmax (4)
where pmax   is the price threshold at which demand for a variety is driven
to zero.
When a variety is produced by a rm with unit labor requirement c, the
corresponding rst order conditions for prot maximization are satised by an
output level equal to
qm(c) =

L
2 (c
m   c) c  cm =   LQm
0 c > cm
(5)
where mlabels equilibrium variable, cm = pmax andQm  NmE
R cM
0
qm(c)dG(c) =
Nm
R cm
0
qm(c)dGm(c) is the total supply of di¤erentiated varieties with NmE
and Nm respectively denoting the number of rms entering the market and
the number of them eventually producing. This is also the number of vari-
eties supplied and is related to the number of entrants by Nm = NmE G(c
m)
where Gm(c) = G(c)=G(cm) is the conditional distribution of unit input re-
quirements for varieties supplied. Expression (5) denes a cuto¤ rule for sur-
vival: only entrants that are productive enough (c  cm) eventually produce.
For them the price that corresponds to the prot-maximizing output qm(c) is
pm(c) = (cm + c) =2, implying markup m(c) = pm(c)   c = (cm   c) =2 and
maximized prot
(c) =
L
4
(cm   c)2 : (6)
Due to free entry and exit, in equilibrium expected prot is exactly o¤set by
the sunk entry cost stemming from the sunk labor requirementZ cm
0
(c)dG(c) = f:
Given (6), this free entry conditioncan be rewritten as
1
4
Z cm
0
(cm   c)2 dG(c) = f
L
: (7)
Finally, the number of producers can be determined as a function of cm by
observing that marginal rms with unit labor requirement c = cm make zero
prot, i.e. p(cm) = cm = pmax. Recalling (4), this implies the following zero
cuto¤ prot condition
cm =
1
Nm + 
(+ Nmpm) (8)
where, due to the law of large numbers, pm is the ex ante expected price
conditional on producing as well as the ex post average price of producers:
pm =
R cm
0
p(c)dGm(c). The zero cuto¤ prot condition (8) can be solved to ob-
tain the equilibrium number of producers (and varieties produced) as a function
of the equilibrium cuto¤
Nm =
2

  cm
cm   cm (9)
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with cm =
hR cm
0
cdGm(c)
i
. The number of entrants is then given by NmE =
Nm=G(cm).
3.2 Optimal Outcome
As the quasi-linearity of (1) implies transferable utility, social welfare may be
expressed as the sum of all consumers utilities. This implies that a benevo-
lent planner chooses the number of varieties and their output levels so as to
maximize the social welfare function given by individual utility (1) times the
number of consumers L, subject to the resource constraint, the homogenous
goods production function, the varietiesproduction functions and the stochas-
tic innovation production function(i.e. the mechanism that determines each
varietys unit labor requirement as a random draw from G(c) after f units of
labor have been allocated to R&D).
Specically, given (1), the planner chooses the number NE of R&D projects
and the output levels of associated varieties so as to maximize social welfare
W = qc0L+ NE
R cM
0
[qc(c)L] dG(c)  12 LNE
R cM
0
[qc(c)L]
2
dG(c)
  12 L

NE
R cM
0
[qc(c)L] dG(c)
2 (10)
with respect to qc0, q
c(c) and NE subject to the aggregate resource constraint
qc0L+ fNE +NE
Z cM
0
cqc(c)LdG(c) = L+ q0L (11)
whereby the supply of the homogeneous good (qc0L), the supply of di¤erenti-
ated varieties (NE
R cM
0
cqc(c)LdG(c)) and the R&D investment (fNE) are con-
strained by the amount of the available endowments of labor (L) and homoge-
nous good (q0).
After substituting (11) into (10), the planners problem can be rewritten as
the maximization of
W = L+ q0L  fNE +NE
R cM
0
(  c) q(c)dG(c)
  12 LNE
R cM
0
[q(c)]
2
dG(c)  12 L

NE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
2 (12)
with respect to q(c) and NE . The corresponding rst order conditions are then
@W
@q(c) =
h
NE (  c)  LNEq(c)  L (NE)2
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
i
dG(c) = 0 (13)
for all values of c and
@W
@NE
=  f + R cM
0
(  c) q(c)dG(c)  12 L
R cM
0
[q(c)]
2
dG(c)
  LNE
R cM
0
q(c)dG(c)
2
= 0:
(14)
As utility can take only positive values, it must be NE > 0 at the optimum.
Rearranging (13) shows that optimal output qo(c) has to satisfy
qo(c) =
L

(  c)  

NoE
Z cM
0
qo(c)dG(c) =
L

(  c)  

Qo (15)
where olabels optimum variables, Qo  L R
i2
 q
c
i di = N
o
E
R cM
0
qo(c)dG(c) =
No
R co
0
qo(c)dGo(c) is the total supply of the di¤erentiated good, and No =
9
NoEG(c
o) is the number of varieties supplied with Go(c) = G(c)=G(co) denoting
the conditional distribution of unit input requirements for varieties that the
planner produces. Equation (15) and the constraint qo(c)  0 imply that the
planner sets
qo(c) =

L
 (c
o   c) c  co =   LQo
0 c > co
: (16)
Result (16) reveals that as the market also the planner follows a cuto¤ rule
allowing only for the production of varieties with low enough unit labor require-
ments: qo(c)  0 only for c  co.
Expressions (16) and (2) can be used to show that the optimal output levels
would clear the market in a decentralized scenario only if each producer priced
at marginal cost. To see this, note that (2) implies q(c) = [ p(c)]L= Q=.
Then, imposing q(c) = qo(c) = (co   c)L= and Q = Qo = (  co)L= from
(16) respectively on the left and on the right hand sides of q(c) = [ p(c)]L= 
Q= gives p(c) = c.
Integrating (13) across c gives
Qo =
No
 + No
L

(  co) ;
with co =
R co
0
cdGo(c). Substituting this result into co =    Qo=L from (16)
and solving for No gives
No =


  co
co   co ; (17)
which is the planners analogue of the market zero cuto¤ prot condition (9).
Finally, substituting (17) and (16) in (14) yields
1
2
Z co
0
(co   c)2 dG(c) = f
L
; (18)
which is the planners analogue of the market free entry condition (7).
4 Equilibrium versus Unconstrained Optimum
The e¢ ciency of the market outcome with respect to the optimum depends on
how the number of varieties actually produced in the market Nm and the (con-
ditional) distribution of their unit labor requirements dictated by the cuto¤ cm
compare to the optimal ones as implied by No and co. In particular, as already
highlighted by Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014), in the market equilibrium
rm selection is too weak due to co < cm, average rm size is too small, low
cost rms are too small and high cost rms are too large. Moreover, product
variety is too rich due to No < Nm (too poor due to No > Nm) when varieties
are close (far) substitutes, the sunk entry cost is small (large), market size is
large (small) and the di¤erence cM between the highest and the lowest possible
marginal cost realizations is small (large).
While we will reproduce these ndings for completeness, our aim here is
to understand how the extent of ine¢ ciency is a¤ected by the degree of rm
heterogeneity. To this aim, we will rst study the extent of ine¢ ciency in the
limit case of homogeneous rms and then discuss what rm heterogeneity adds
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to the picture. In so doing, we will show that our framework encompasses
previous results obtained by Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) with homogenous
rms and similar preferences.
4.1 Homogeneous Firms
The case of homogeneous rms is represented by a degenerate distribution in
which all rms have the same unit labor requirement. In this case there is,
therefore, no variance in labor requirements (2c = 0), all entrants produce
(G(cm) = 1), and c is exogenous, common to all rms and thus equal to the
average unit labor requirement (c = c).
To help comparison with Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), we express the model
in terms of conditional average c(x) and conditional variance 2c(x) of the unit
labor requirement distribution for x = fcm; cog where, by denition, we have
c(x) =
R x
0
cdG(c)

=G(x) and 2c(x) =
R x
0
c2dG(c)

=G(x)   c(x)2. The free
entry condition (7) in the market equilibrium can then be rewritten as
1
4
G(cm)
n
[cm   c(cm)]2 + 2c(cm)
o
=
f
L
(19)
while the corresponding condition (18) for the planner becomes
1
2
G(co)
n
[co   c(co)]2 + 2c(co)
o
=
f
L
: (20)
As for the market outcome, solving expression (19) under G(cm) = 1 and
c(cm) = c yields the equilibrium cuto¤ with homogeneous rms (willingness to
pay)
cm = c+ 2
r
f
L
: (21)
As cm is larger than the common marginal cost c, all entrants produce. Given
(5), the equilibrium quantity produced of each good is qm(c) = L (cm   c) = (2),
which can then be used together with (21) to nd the equilibrium output of each
rm
qm =
s
fL

: (22)
Finally, the equilibrium number of varieties supplied can be found by plugging
the cuto¤ value (21) into the zero cuto¤ prot condition (9) to obtain
Nm =
(  c)
q
L
f   2

; (23)
so that in equilibrium total supply of the di¤erentiated good evaluates to
qmNm =
(  c)

L  21

p
fL: (24)
Turning to the planner outcome, condition (20) can be solved under G(co) =
1 and c(co) = c to nd the optimal cuto¤
co = c+
p
2
r
f
L
: (25)
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As co is larger than the common marginal cost c, also in the optimum all entrants
produce. Plugging the cuto¤ value (25) into the cuto¤ rule (16) determines the
optimal output of each good
qo =
p
2
s
fL

: (26)
The corresponding optimal number of varieties supplied can be retrieved by
combining (17) and (25) to yield
No =
(  c)
q
L
2f   

: (27)
Optimal total supply of the di¤erentiated good then evaluates to
qoNo =
(  c)

L  1

p
2fL: (28)
Comparisons of the equilibrium and the optimal outcomes reveal several
ways in which the former is ine¢ cient. Comparing (26) and (24) with (22)
and (28) respectively show that in the market equilibrium each rm and the
di¤erentiated good sector as a whole are smaller than optimal (qm < qo and
qmNm < qoNo). Hence, we can write:
Proposition 1 (Between-sector misallocation) When rms are homoge-
neous, in the market equilibrium the total supply of the di¤erentiated good sector
as well as the quantity supplied of each variety are smaller than optimal.
The intuition behind this proposition can be gauged by recalling that, as
discussed in Section 3.1, in the market equilibrium the markup of a rm with
marginal cost c equals m(c) = pm(c)   c = (cm   c) =2. With homogeneous
rms we have c = c and thus m(c) = (cm   c) =2 so that all rms supply the
same quantity and quote the same positive markup above marginal cost. Ac-
cordingly, consumption is ine¢ ciently biased against the di¤erentiated varieties
and in favor of the numeraire good as the prices of the former are ine¢ ciently
above marginal cost.
Turning to product variety, (27) and (23) imply that the number of varieties
supplied by the market is ine¢ ciently large (Nm > No) when varieties are close
substitutes ( is small), the entry labor requirement f is low relative to market
size as measured by  and L, and when the (average) unit labor requirement c
is low, that is when
 > c+
p
2p
2  1
r
f
L
:
Vice versa, the market tends to underprovide variety (Nm < No) when the
opposite inequality holds. These results concur with those in Ottaviano and
Thisse (1999) once we account for their parametrization L = 1 and c = 0. We
can summarize the foregoing as:
Proposition 2 (Ine¢ cient product variety) When rms are homogeneous,
in the market equilibrium product variety is richer (poorer) than in the optimum
when varieties are close (far) substitutes, the entry cost is small (large), market
size is large (small) and average unit input requirement is low (high).
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From the demand functions it is apparent that these propositions are driven
by the fact that (21) and (25) imply cm > co, leading to:
Proposition 3 (Ine¢ cient willingness to pay) When rms are homoge-
neous, in the market equilibrium the cost cuto¤ is ine¢ ciently large.
Clearly, with homogeneous rm selection is immaterial. This is the main
di¤erence with respect to a situation where rms are heterogeneous, to which
we turn next.
4.2 Heterogeneous Firms
To study the role of rm heterogeneity we follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
and Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014) in assuming that rms draw their mar-
ginal productivity 1=c from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k  1
over the support [1=cM ;1) and thus their unit input requirement c from a
distribution with cumulative density function
G(c) =

c
cM
k
, c 2 [0; cM ]: (29)
For k = 1 the distribution is uniform. As k rises, density is skewed towards the
upper bound of the support.
As for the market outcome, under this distributional assumption the free
entry condition(7) becomes
cm
cM
k
L (cm)
2
2(k + 1)(k + 2)
= f; (30)
where, due to the law of large numbers, the two terms of (30) have a double
interpretation: G(cm) = (cm=cM )
k is the ex ante probability that an entrant
will produce as well as the ex post share of entrants that eventually produce;
and L (cm)2 =[2(k + 1)(k + 2)] is the ex ante expected prot conditional on
producing as well as the ex post average prot of producers.
Condition (30) can be solved for the unique equilibrium cuto¤marginal cost
cm =
"
2(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
: (31)
This implies that the average unit labor requirent of producers is cm = cmk=(k+
1), which can be substituted into the zero cuto¤ prot condition(9) to obtain
the equilibrium number of producers (and varieties produced)
Nm =
2(k + 1)

  cm
cm
; (32)
with the corresponding equilibrium number of entrants given byNmE = N
m=G(cm) =
Nm (cM=c
m)
k given that the conditional distribution satisesGm(c) = G(c)=G(cm) =
(c=cm)
k.
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Turning to the optimum, using the distributional assumption (29) in condi-
tion (18) gives 
co
cM
k
L (co)
2
(k + 1)(k + 2)
= f (33)
so that the optimal cuto¤ evaluates to
co =
"
(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
: (34)
Assumption (29) also implies that the planners cuto¤ condition (17) becomes
No = NoEG(c
o) =
(k + 1)

  co
co
(35)
with the correspondingNoE = N
o=G(co) = No (cM=c
o)
k givenGo(c) = G(c)=G(co) =
(c=co)
k.
Comparing the equilibrium cuto¤, number of varieties and quantities sup-
plied with the optimal ones nds results with rm heterogeneity (already high-
lighted by Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014) broadly in line with those reported
in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 with homogeneous rms. Yet, there are some di¤er-
ences.
Proposition 2 applies to the case of heterogeneous rms qualitatively un-
changed. As in the homogeneous rms case, with rm heterogeneity we have
Nm > No if and only if varieties are close substitutes ( small), the entry re-
quirement f is low and the mean of the (unconditional) distribution of unit
labor requirements (dictated by cM ) are small compared with market size as
measured by  and L. Indeed, from direct comparison between (32) and (35)
given (31) and (34), cm = 21=(k+2)co implies Nm > No as long as
 > 1  c
o
2
k+1
k+2   1
=
1
2
k+1
k+2   1
"
(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
; (36)
which is the case when  as well as L are large and when not only  and
f but also cM are small. However, when rms are heterogeneous there is a
di¤erence between rms that enter and rms that produce as some rms that
enter the market may decide not to produce after observing their high unit
labor requirement. If we use N jE for j 2 fm; og to denote the equilibrium and
optimal number of entrants(i.e. varieties that are designed but not necessarily
produced) in the market and the optimal outcomes, then we have
N jE =
N j
G(cj)
= N j
cM
cj
k
: (37)
This can be used together with (32) and (35) as well as (31) and (34), to show
that cm = 21=(k+2)co imply NmE > N
o
E as long as
 > 2  2
2=(k+2)   1
21=(k+2)   1c
o =
22=(k+2)   1
21=(k+2)   1
"
(k + 1)(k + 2) (cM )
k
f
L
# 1
k+2
(38)
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with 2 > 1. Condition (38) holds in the same (qualitative) situations as
condition (36), that is, when  as well as L are large and , f as well as cM are
small.
Also Proposition 3 still holds qualitatively unchanged as (31) and (34) im-
ply that in the market equilibrium the cuto¤ is ine¢ ciently large (co < cm).
However, with rm heterogeneity co < cm entails ine¢ cient selection as some
varieties with high unit input requirement c 2 [co; cm] are supplied by the mar-
ket but not by the planner (extensive margin misallocation). Moreover, while
with rm heterogeneity in the market equilibrium the total supply of the di¤er-
entiated good sector is still smaller than optimal, among the varieties supplied
both by the market and the planner, the cuto¤ rules (5) and (16) imply that
the output of the varieties with high unit labor requirement is ine¢ ciently large
while the output of those with low unit labor requirement is ine¢ ciently small
(intensive margin misallocation). In detail, given cm = 21=(k+2)co, it is read-
ily veried that qm(c) > qo(c) if and only if c >
 
2  21=(k+2) co, which falls
in the relevant interval [0; co] as we have 0 <
 
2  3p2 <  2  21=(k+2) < 1.
Hence, with respect to the optimum, the market equilibrium undersupplies va-
rieties with marginal cost c 2 [0;  2  21=(k+2) co) and oversupplies varieties
with marginal cost c 2 ( 2  21=(k+2) co; cm]. The intuition behind this result
is that in equilibrium rms with lower unit labor requirement do not pass on
their entire cost advantage to consumers as they absorb part of it in the markup
and this decreases with the unit labor requirement. Hence, the price ratio of
higher cost rms to lower cost rms is smaller than the ratio of their marginal
costs and thus the quantities sold by the former are too large from an e¢ ciency
point of view relative to those sold by the latter.
To summarize what is di¤erent from the homogeneous rm case, we can
state:
Proposition 4 (Between- and within-sector misallocation) When rms
are heterogeneous, in the market equilibrium the total supply of the di¤erentiated
good sector is smaller than optimal. However: (i) some varieties with high unit
input requirement are supplied while they should not from an e¢ ciency point
of view; (ii) as for varieties that should be supplied also from an e¢ ciency
viewpoint, the output of those with lower unit input requirement is smaller than
optimal while the output of those with higher unit input requirement is larger
than optimal.
5 Firm Heterogeneity and Market Ine¢ ciency
The previous section has shown that rm heterogeneity is an important source
of misallocation at the extensive and intensive margins across rms within the
di¤erentiated good sector. We now discuss how the extent of ine¢ ciency is
a¤ected by the degree of rm heterogeneity. The key question here is whether or
not the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection is needed
most, that is, when there are a lot of rms with high unit labor requirement
and only few with low unit labor requirement.
As discussed by Ottaviano (2012), the scale and shape parameters of the
Pareto distribution (29) regulate the heterogeneity of cost draws along two
dimensions: richnessand evenness(Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani,
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2003). First, the scale parameter cM quanties richness, dened as the measure
(number) of di¤erent unit labor requirements that can be drawn. Larger cM
leads to a rise in heterogeneity along the richness dimension, and this is achieved
by making it possible to draw also larger unit labor requirements. Second, the
shape parameter k is an inverse measure of evenness, dened as the similarity
between the probabilities of those di¤erent draws to happen. When k = 1,
the unit labor requirement distribution is uniform on [0; cM ] with maximum
evenness. As k increases, the distribution becomes more concentrated at higher
unit labor requirements close to cM : evenness falls. As k goes to innity, the
distribution becomes degenerate at cM : all draws deliver a unit labor require-
ment cM with probability one. Hence, smaller k leads to a rise in heterogeneity
along the evenness dimension, and this is achieved by making low unit labor
requirements more likely without changing the unit labor requirements that are
possible. Accordingly, more richness (larger cM ) comes with higher average unit
labor requirement (cost-increasing richness), more evenness (smaller k) comes
with lower average unit labor requirement (cost-decreasing evenness).
Given the cuto¤ expressions (31) and (34), more heterogeneity has di¤erent
impacts on selection depending on whether it comes through more richness or
evenness. To see this, rewrite (31) and (34) as
cm
cM
k "
L
4
2 (cm)
2
(k + 2) (k + 1)
#
= f
and 
co
cM
k "
L
2
2 (cm)
2
(k + 2) (k + 1)
#
= f;
where (cm=cM )
k and (co=cM )
k are the shares of viable varieties and the brack-
eted terms are average rm prot for the market equilibrium and average sur-
plus per variety for the optimum respectively. For any given cuto¤s, more
cost-increasing richness (larger cM ) decreases the left hand sides of both expres-
sions through its depressing e¤ect on the share of viable varieties. As the right
hand sides are constant, (31) and (34) can keep on holding only if the cuto¤s
rise. Di¤erently, for any given cuto¤s (smaller than cM ), more cost-decreasing
evenness (smaller k) increases the left hand sides of both expressions through
its enhancing e¤ect on both the share of viable varieties and average prot or
surplus. Again, as the right hand sides are constant, (31) and (34) can keep
on holding only if the cuto¤s fall. Hence, while more cost-increasing richness
makes selection softer, more cost-decreasing evenness makes it tougher.
When we focus on the percentage deviation of the market equilibrium from
the optimum, only the change in evenness matters for several outcomes. Specif-
ically, given cm = 21=(k+2)co, more evenness (smaller k) leads to a larger per-
centage gap in the cuto¤s between the market equilibrium and the optimum
((cm   co) =co rises) whereas more richness is immaterial. Hence, we have:
Proposition 5 (Heterogeneity and extensive margin misallocation) More
cost-decreasing evenness increases the percentage gap in the cuto¤s between the
market equilibrium and the optimum. Cost-increasing richness has no impact
on this gap.
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Several implications can be derived from Proposition 5. First, recall that,
with respect to the optimum, the market equilibrium undersupplies varieties
with marginal cost c 2 [0;  2  21=(k+2) co) and oversupplies varieties with mar-
ginal cost c 2 ( 2  21=(k+2) co; cm]. When k falls  2  21=(k+2) co=cm also falls
whereas it does not change when cM changes. This leads to:
Corollary 6 (Heterogeneity and intensive margin misallocation) More
cost-decreasing evenness makes the overprovision of varieties relatively more
likely than its underprovision in the market equilibrium. Cost-increasing rich-
ness has no impact on this.
Second, we know that the overall size of the di¤erentiated good sector in
the market equilibrium is smaller than optimal. However, expressions Nmqm =
(L=) (  cm) and Noqo = (L=) (  co) imply that there can exist a thresh-
old value k of k such that we have:
Corollary 7 (Heterogeneity and between-sector misallocation) More cost-
decreasing evenness decreases the gap in the total output of the di¤erentiated
varieties between the market equilibrium and the optimum for k > k and, vicev-
ersa, it increases the gap for k < k. The threshold value k increases with L
and cM , and decreases with  and f . However, if L and cM are su¢ ciently small
and/or  and f are su¢ ciently large, more cost-decreasing evenness does always
decrease the gap. More cost-increasing richness always increases the gap.4
Third, expressions (32) and (35) with the associated condition (36) lead to:
Corollary 8 (Heterogeneity and product variety) Less cost-decreasing even-
ness and more cost-increasing richness makes the underprovision of variety rel-
atively more likely than its overprovision in the market equilibrium.
Analogously, given (37) and the associated condition (38), we can write:
Corollary 9 (Heterogeneity and entry) Less cost-decreasing evenness and
more cost-increasing richness makes insu¢ cient entry relatively more likely than
excess entry in the market equilibrium.
Finally, we can look at the relation between heterogeneity and welfare. We
prove in the Appendix that we have:
Corollary 10 (Heterogeneity and welfare) More cost increasing richness
increases the welfare gap between the optimum and the market equilibrium if
the preference for the di¤erentiated good () is su¢ ciently large; otherwise it
decreases that gap.
4More precisely, more cost-decreasing evenness increases the gap ifh
2
1
k+2 ln 2  (2k + 3)

2
1
k+2   1

= (k + 1)
i
=

2
1
k+2   1

+ ln ((k + 1)(k + 2)) >
ln

Lc2M= (f)

; viceversa, it decreases the gap if the opposite inequality sign
holds. The threshold k corresponds to the value at which the functionh
2
1
k+2 ln 2  (2k + 3)

2
1
k+2   1

= (k + 1)
i
=

2
1
k+2   1

+ ln ((k + 1)(k + 2)), (which is
increasing in k) crosses ln

Lc2M= (f)

, and it exists only if L and cM are su¢ ciently large
and/or  and f are su¢ ciently small.
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Moreover, numerical analysis shows that when  is su¢ ciently large, more
cost-decreasing evenness decreases (increases) the welfare gap if k is initially
low (high). In other words, from a welfare point of view, when the preference
for the di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently large, the ine¢ ciency of the market
equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most: many rms with high unit
labor requirement coexist with few rms with high labor requirement.
6 Constrained Optimum
The decentralization of the optimal outcome with rm heterogeneity we have
discussed so far requires a rich set of policy tools to correct for both between-
and within-sector misallocation. In particular, rm-specic per unit transfers
are needed to deal with within-sector misallocation at the intensive margin and
lump sum trasfers for rms are needed to deal with within-sector misallocation
at the extensive margin.
When such tools are not available, policy makers cannot a¤ect rmspricing
and selection but can only target product variety. In this case the most they
can do from a welfare viewpoint is to implement the second bestallocation
of a constrained planner who maximizes (12) with respect to NE subject to
two constraints: prot maximizing output (5) and the free entry condition (30).
These impose the planner the market cuto¤(31). Therefore, substituting (5) and
(30) in (12) allows us to rewrite the constrained problem as the maximization
of
W = L+ q0L+
2 (k + 2)  (2k + 3) cm
2cm
fNE    (k + 2) (c
m)k
4 (k + 1) (cM )
k
f (NE)
2 (39)
with respect to NE . Using NE = N (cM=cm)
k to substitute for NE in the rst
order condition of the planners problem yields
Ns =
2 (k + 1)

  2k+32(k+2)cm
cm
: (40)
Comparing this expression with (32) reveals that product variety is richer in
the constrained optimum than in the market equilibrium, while each varietys
output is the same as implied under (5) by the fact that the cuto¤ is identical
in both outcomes. Specically, one can compute the di¤erence between the
numbers of varieties in the constrained optimum and in the market equilibrium
as
Ns  Nm =  (k + 1)
 (k + 2)
;
which is always positive. The impact of heterogeneity on the ine¢ ciency of the
market equilibrium with respect to the constrained optimum can be assessed by
noticing that richness cM does not a¤ect Ns   Nm whereas @ (Ns  Nm) =@k
is also always positive. This leads to:
Proposition 11 (Heterogeneity, product variety and constrained e¢ -
ciency) While by denition the output of each variety and the average output
per variety in the market equilibrium and in the constrained optimum coincide,
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product variety is poorer in the former than in the latter outcome. Less cost-
decreasing evenness fosters the underprovision of variety in the market equilib-
rium with respect to the constrained optimum. Cost-increasing richness does not
impact the extent of such underprovision.
In order to assess the impact of heterogeneity on welfare, expression (40) can
be used together with NE = N (cM=cm)
k to substitute for NE while (30) can
be used to substitute for f in the planners objective. These substitutions allow
us to express welfare in the constrained optimum as a function of the market
cuto¤
W s = L+ q0L+
L
2

  2k + 3
2(k + 2)
cm
2
;
which is smaller than W o but larger than Wm. The welfare gap between the
constrained optimum and the market equilibrium evaluates to
W s  Wm = L
8

cm
k + 2
2
and, given (31), it is readily veried that we have @ (W s  Wm) =@cM > 0.
Hence, less cost-increasing richness (smaller cM ) reduces the welfare gap between
the market outcome and the constrained optimum. Analogously, given (31),
derivation of W s  Wm with respect to k yields
@ (W s  Wm)
@k
=
L
4
(cm)2
(k+2)4(k+1)
h
(k + 1) ln (cM )
2L
2(k+1)(k+2)f  
 
k + k2   1i ;
which is positive (negative) for k < k (k > k) when ln
h
(cM )
2
L= (12f)
i
>
1=2, where k > 1 is the value of k that solves
ln
n
(cM )
2
L= [2(k + 1)(k + 2)f ]
o
=
 
k   1 + k2 = (k + 1) :
Otherwise, when ln
h
(cM )
2
L= (12f)
i
< 1=2, @ (W s  Wm) =@k < 0 holds.5
Hence, we can conclude that:
Corollary 12 (Heterogeneity, welfare and constrained e¢ ciency) Less
cost-increasing richness (smaller cM ) reduces the welfare gap between the con-
strained optimum and the market equilibrium. The same happens in the case of
more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller k) when initial evenness is high. Dif-
ferently, when initial evenness is low, more cost-decreasing evenness raises the
gap.
As in the case of the unconstrainedoptimum, the ine¢ ciency of the market
equilibrium is largest when selection is needed most.
5The term (cM )
2 L= [2(k + 1)(k + 2)f ] is larger than 1 to ensure cm < cM . Then the
left hand side of the equation, ln
n
(cM )
2 L= [2(k + 1)(k + 2)f ]
o
, is a positive and decreasing
function of k. The right hand side,
 
k   1 + k2 = (k + 1), is instead a positive and increasing
function of k, attaining value 1=2 at k = 1. Hence, the two functions cross only once at
k = k > 1 if ln
h
(cM )
2 L= (12f)
i
> 1=2.
19
7 Conclusion
After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties
of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the heterogeneous
rms revolutionin international trade theory initiated by Melitz (2003). The
availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with rm
heterogeneity allows one to bring back into the normative debate the full set
of questions the canonical formalization of the Chamberlinian model by Spence
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) was designed to answer. In particular, it
provides a useful analytical tool to address the question whether in the market
equilibrium the products are supplied by the right set of rms, or there are
rather errorsin the choice of technique.
We have contributed to this debate by showing that the market outcome errs
in many ways. In particular we proved that heterogeneity in rmss production
costs add specic distortions to the models with homogeneous rms on the one
hand and with CES utility function on the other, with respect to the selection
of rms, number of products, the size and the selection of producers. More
crucially with respect to the existing literature, we have also shown that the
extent of the errors depends on the degree of rm heterogeneity. In particular,
we have found that the ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium tends to be largest
when selection is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many rms with
low productivity and relatively few rms with high productivity. This holds from
the viewpoints of both unconstrained and constrained e¢ ciency.
These insights have been obtained for a parametrization of demand that is
admittedly specic but still non-separable and more exible than the CES. Also
the adopted parametrization of the distribution of rm productivity is quite
specic. While it would be important to understand whether our results would
apply to a more general setup, this is left to future research.
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8 Appendix: Proof of Corollary 10
The welfare attained in the market equilibrium can be expressed as a function
of the corresponding cuto¤ through the following substitutions in the planners
objective (12). Expression (32) can be used together with NE = N (cM=cm)
k to
substitute for NE . Expression (30) can be used to substitute for f . Expression
(5) can be used to substitute for q(c). These substitutions give
Wm = L+ q0L+
L
2
(  cm)

  k + 1
k + 2
cm

: (41)
Analogously, the welfare level attained in the optimum can be expressed as
a function of the corresponding cuto¤ through the following substitutions in
the planners objective (12). Expression (35) can be used together with NE =
N (cM=c
m)
k to substitute for NE . Expression (33) can be used to substitute for
f . Expression (16) can be used to substitute for q(c). These substitutions give:
W o = L+ q0L+
L
2
(  co)2 : (42)
Given cm = 21=(k+2)co, the gap in the welfare level between the optimum and
the market equilibrium in (42) and (41) can be written as
W o  Wm = acm L
2
; (43)
where a  b dcm, b  (2k+3)= (k + 2) 2(k+1)=(k+2) and d  (k + 1) = (k + 2) 
2 2=(k+2). Given that =cm > 1 > d=b, it is readily veried that a > 0 and,
consequently, W o > Wm.
Derivation of (43) with respect to cM then gives
@ (W o  Wm)
@cM
=
L
2
" 
2k + 3
k + 2
 

1
2
  k+1k+2!
  2
 
k + 1
k + 2
 

1
2
 2
k+2
!
cm
#
@cm
@cM
;
where @cm=@cM > 0 and the sign of the term in the square brackets depends
on the value of : it is positive (negative) for  > (<)3 with
3  2
k+1
k+2  
 
1
2
 2
k+2
2k+3
k+2  
 
1
2
  k+1k+2 cm:
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Hence, we have that, as stated in Corollary 10, more cost increasing richness
increases the gap W o   Wm if the preference for the di¤erentiated good is
su¢ ciently large (small), i.e.  > 3 ( < 3).
Moreover, derivation with respect to k gives
@ (W o  Wm)
@k
=
= f[

2k+3
k+2  
 
1
2
  k+1k+2 (k+1) ln( cMcm )(k+2)+2k+3
(k+1)  

2
k+1
k+2 ln 2  1

]+
+[2
k
k+2 ln 2  1  2

k+1
k+2  
 
1
2
 2
k+2

(k+1) ln( cMcm )
(k+2)
+2k+3
(k+1) ]c
mg L
2(k+2)2
cm
and numerical analysis shows that, when  is su¢ ciently large, more cost-
decreasing evenness decreases (increases) the gap W o   Wm if k is initially
low (high). Indeed, the coe¢ cient of  is positive for k initially low and thus
the term in the curly brackets is positive if
 >
2

k+1
k+2 ( 12 )
2
k+2
 (k+1) ln( cMcm )(k+2)+2k+3
(k+1)  

2
k
k+2 ln 2 1


2k+3
k+2  ( 12 )
  k+1
k+2
 (k+1) ln( cMcm )(k+2)+2k+3
(k+1)  

2
k+1
k+2 ln 2 1
cm:
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